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IN THE YEARS SINCE the Second World War, "higher education" 
has emerged as one of the major influences in American life. Well 
over 50 percent of the age cohort now in its teens or early twenties 
will attend a college or university, more than a five-fold increase from 
the prewar period. Moreover, colleges and universities now engage in 
so broad a range of activities that the appellation "higher education" 
no longer seems entirely appropriate to describe the institutions. Com-
munity colleges, but also four-year colleges and universities, play a 
major role in training individuals for skilled and semiskilled occupa-
tions. Universities are our most important centers of research, and 
they have become so, significantly, at a time of unprecedented societal 
dependence on research. They are major providers of medical care. 
Their faculty members figure prominently as experts for government, 
industry, and the media; and their athletic teams are important sources 
of mass entertainment. 
The list might be extended, but the point is clear enough. Higher 
education has become what in a different setting we call a 
"conglomerate," and a very large one at that. It employs over two 
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million men and women, its annual expenditures exceed $100 bil-
lion, and its total assets approach $200 billion. To be sure, the system 
of higher education is highly decentralized and diverse, so that it is 
often misleading to think of it in aggregate terms, but even individual 
institutions have achieved considerable size and wealth. The largest 
have annual budgets that exceed one billion dollars, assets totaling 
several times that amount, and employment rolls that number in the 
tens of thousands. 
The question we have been asked to consider-the appropriate role 
of universities in forming a social morality-arises almost inevitably 
from the growing importance of higher education in our national 
life. Influence carries with it an expectation of responsibility, and an 
institution as influential as the American system of higher education 
might well be thought to have some responsibility for addressing 
pervasive social issues. The widespread belief that our national moral 
life is in need of repair thus seems to lead naturally to questions about 
the contribution higher education should make to the process of moral 
renewal. 
I 
Although universities are in many respects distinctive institutions, 
the question of their appropriate role in forming a social morality is 
an aspect of a larger problem that our society has not satisfactorily 
addressed, though it presses on us more and more insistently. How 
are we to think about the moral responsibility of institutions? It is a 
commonplace that we live in an age of large organizations, an age in 
which the pursuit of our goals requires collective action on a large 
scale. Automobiles cannot be built, nor the next generation educated, 
by individuals acting alone or in small groups. And so, large organiza-
tions are established to perform these and many other important 
functions. Yet, we lack an intellectual framework for thinking about 
the moral responsibilities of these organizations. Our ideas about 
moral responsibility have been formed in reference to individuals. 
Because those ideas presuppose understanding and will- distinctively 
human characteristics-they cannot readily be transferred to institu-
tions. Nor is that the only difficulty. The collective exercise of power 
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poses troublesome issues that are not raised when power is exercised 
by individuals. Institutions are formed to achieve limited objectives, 
and the authority conferred on those who direct them is circum-
scribed by those objectives. The attempt to ascribe moral responsibil-
ity to institutions thus raises issues of fiduciary obligation and the use 
of delegated power that ordinarily need not be confronted when a 
question is raised about the moral responsibility of individuals. 
An illustration will help to reveal the difficulty of those issues. A 
few years ago a great national debate occurred about whether Amer-
ican corporations should cease doing business in South Africa. Propo-
nents of disinvestment maintained that, by continuing to do business 
there, corporations were helping to maintain a brutal and racist 
regime. Opponents rested mainly on the contention that disinvest-
ment would seriously harm South Africa's black population and 
deprive American business of whatever influence it might have in 
bringing about an end to apartheid. A quite different reason for 
opposing disinvestment is suggested by an argument Milton Fried-
man has made against the claim that corporations have social re-
sponsibilities beyond their obligations to shareholders to maximize 
profits.' If corporations have other social obligations, he asks, how are 
corporate officers to know what they are? The power the officers have 
been given has been conferred on the understanding that it would be 
employed in the interest of shareholders-not, moreover, in the latter's 
general interest, but in the service of their limited interest in profit 
maximization. No one has authorized corporate officers to decide 
what the public interest requires or what burdens they can justifiably 
impose on shareholders in promoting interests other than the latter's 
interest in profits. 
Friedman's argument has great force, but it does not satisfactorily 
resolve the problem of corporate social responsibility. Most economic 
activity is now carried on by corporations. The consequence of accept-
ing Friedman's argument would thus be to free the largest part of our 
economic life from the moral judgments that we would expect to 
inform and constrain the same activities if they were undertaken by 
individuals. Were mM owned by an individual, no one would sup-
pose that his decision whether or not to do business in South Africa 
should rest solely on an inquiry into the profitability of the activity. 2 
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Yet, on Professor Friedman's argument, precisely that outcome is 
required if the activity is conducted by a corporation. His only 
response to this difficulty is to point to the power of government to 
prohibit economic activities that are regarded as socially undesirable. 
The wisdom of relying exclusively on law to mark out the limits of 
socially acceptable economic activity is, however, very doubtful. Indi-
viduals do not generally regard themselves as having satisfied their 
moral obligations merely because they have complied with the law, 
nor does it seem socially desirable that they should do so. The limits 
of what we seek to achieve by law are not coextensive with our moral 
ideas, in part because government lacks power to intrude into our 
lives in sufficient depth and in part because we do not wish it to have 
such power. Similar considerations argue against exclusive reliance on 
law to limit corporations' profit-seeking activities. 
Although Professor Friedman's conclusion respecting the bound-
aries of corporate social responsibility is unsatisfactory, the force of 
his argument needs to be recognized. It too rests on moral claims. In 
the first instance, there is the claim of shareholders that the power 
they have conferred for a limited purpose should not be employed for 
other purposes. Ultimately, however, Friedman's argument rests on 
an even more fundamental moral claim, one that involves the adverse 
economic consequences of permitting investment in corporations only 
on the understanding that they may be employed to pursue whatever 
objectives are regarded as morally appropriate by those who control 
them. The considerations that incline us against Friedman's argument 
do not answer these claims. They merely demonstrate that the prob-
lem is more difficult than his argument recognizes. The officers of a 
corporation are not and should not be free to manage its affairs on the 
same moral principles that would guide them if the corporation were 
theirs, but neither should they take the law as their exclusive moral 
guide. It is more difficult to say what they should do. Despite the 
importance of corporations in our economic life, we have not yet 
found a satisfactory way to address that question. 
Universities are not profit-making enterprises, but as they go about 
their activities, issues are recurrently raised that are very similar to 
those presented by the question of corporate social responsibility . 
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They too have been established for limited purposes, and the author-
ity conferred on those who control them is limited accordingly. By 
what right can the latter employ that power for other purposes? And 
yet, it is true of universities no less than of corporations that the 
single-minded pursuit of the limited purposes for which they are estab-
lished would free an important part of our social life from the moral 
judgments that should inform it. Recent history suggests the range 
and importance of the issues affected by this dilemma. The disinvest-
ment question that has been so divisive an issue in many universities is 
nearly identical with that faced by corporations: Should a university 
sell its holdings in companies doing business in South Africa even 
though that would reduce the value of its endowment, or would 
doing so break faith both with donors who understood that their 
gifts would be used for educational purposes and with the intended 
beneficiaries of those gifts? Should universities accept contracts for 
weapons research? Are racial preferences in admission or hiring 
morally permissible (or morally required)? Should universities make 
their placement facilities available to the CIA and the Department of 
Defense? To employers that discriminate against homosexuals? 
What are the responsibilities of a college or university to its local 
community? 
The distinctive characteristics of universities are likely to color the 
issues somewhat, but arguments about their moral responsibility that 
turn on their institutional character (as distinguished from arguments 
based on the nature of the enterprise) are in the main similar for 
universities and for corporations. There is, however, one important 
difference between the two that merits attention. The locus of author-
ity is a good deal more difficult to locate in universities than in corpo-
rations. By law, the directors of a corporation are responsible for its 
management. The same is technically true of the trustees or regents of 
a university, but the social understanding is very different. Universi-
ties are expected to be, and generally are, less hierarchical and less 
tightly organized than corporations. Individual faculty members enjoy 
considerably greater freedom from institutional control than do the 
professional employees of corporations. A chemist employed by a 
pharmaceutical company is expected to engage in research that his 
superiors have determined to be in the best interests of the company. 
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Neither university trustees, nor deans, nor the faculty collectively 
would presume to exercise similar control over the research of a 
faculty member or the content of his courses. The governing princi-
ple, with relatively rare and narrow exceptions, is laissez-faire. How 
are we to think about the responsibility of an institution that has so 
little control over those who act under its auspices? 
When institutional decisions are required, moreover, authority is a 
good deal more diffuse in universities than in corporations. Members 
of the faculty are technically employees, but tradition accords them a 
role in the governance of the institution very different from that of 
corporate employees. Students might conceivably be likened to the 
customers of a business, but the reality is plainly otherwise. They are 
more nearly like members of a community, entitled (in uncertain 
measure) to participate in its decisions. Trustees, administrators, and 
alumni also have claims to membership in the community and, there-
fore, a claim to participate in its governance. Although tradition 
accords different degrees of responsibility for one or another decision 
to one or another group, the understanding is fluid and shifting. Uni-
versities are, therefore, likely to be run more by consensus than com-
mand, a characteristic that embarrasses still further the task of 
ascribing responsibility to them. 
Whatever difficulties we may encounter in thinking about institu-
tional responsibility, the appropriate role of universities in forming a 
social morality is likely to continue as a subject of concern. The range 
and scale of their activities have made their behavior a matter of con-
sequence. The decisions they make-about whom to educate, about 
the content and ends of education, about the proper subjects of 
research and the priorities among them, and about a host of other 
issues-have sufficient moral importance that they must be regarded 
as significant elements in any description of the state of our social 
morality. Beyond their immediate importance, moreover, the 
decisions taken by universities may have a significant effect on the 
attitudes and behavior of other institutions and of individuals. The 
latter will often be as important as the former, at times even more so. 
A university's decision about whether to disinvest in companies doing 
business in South Africa is not likely to have a direct effect on the 
plight of South Africa's blacks, but it may well help to shape a societal 
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understanding about whether injustice in that distant place is an 
appropriate concern of Americans. A decision about the use of the 
university's placement facilities by employers that discriminate against 
homosexuals may or may not affect the employment opportunities of 
homosexual students, but it is likely to influence societal judgments 
about homosexuality and about whether discrimination against homo-
sexuals is a matter of social concern. 
The influence of universities on societal morality helps to explain 
why they have in recent years become so prominent a battleground. 
Groups making moral claims are likely to see the capture of universi-
ties as an important victory, gaining for them a site that is not only 
itself an important piece of social territory, but that also offers a 
staging ground for pressing their claims elsewhere. The force of their 
moral claims has seemed to many an adequate justification for the 
effort to turn the university to their purposes. Yet, there is, in E. M. 
Forster's phrase, a "morality of morality." The question of how moral 
ends should be pursued is itself an important moral question. 
The difficulties that we confront in discussing the moral responsi-
bilities of an institution are not merely impediments to a judgment 
about whether it can be "blamed" for an action. They are equally 
relevant to judgments by those within the institution about the ends 
toward which they may appropriately seek to direct it. The trustees of 
a university are no more justified than the directors of a corporation 
in employing its resources to promote whatever ends they would 
regard as morally appropriate were the resources their own. From 
time to time, one hears the argument that, whatever limits there may 
be on the rightful exercise of power by trustees, the university com-
munity as a whole should be free to employ the institution's resources 
toward one or another end. Just what is meant by the "community as 
a whole" when the "community" is as amorphous as a university is 
unclear, but even if that difficulty were overcome, other problems 
remain. Collective decision about the moral ends that the university 
should serve threatens the diffusion of authority characteristic of 
universities, a characteristic that itself rests on important moral con-
siderations. Moreover, the members of the university community-
faculty, students, trustees, donors, and whoever else may have a claim 
to membership-have not come together for the purpose of jointly 
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promoting the common good. Their association in the university has 
more limited purposes, and it is by no means evident what warrant a 
majority, even a very large majority, can claim for employing the 
institution for other purposes. 
Despite these considerations, it seems inappropriate to conclude 
that the members of the university community must refrain from any 
effort to bring its activities into line with their moral judgments. That 
conclusion would merely elevate the moral concerns on which it rests 
to a position of priority over other moral concerns with which they 
may at times collide. The priority of the former may at times be 
appropriate, but it is not evident that there is any a priori justification 
for concluding that they always are. A more discriminating analysis is 
required, one that takes account of differences among the issues that 
universities confront. A brief essay is not a suitable vehicle for a com-
prehensive analysis of those issues, but it may be useful to suggest a 
number of considerations that should inform the analysis. 
At times, as when decisions are made about which students to 
admit, a university must speak with a single voice to an issue it cannot 
avoid, but that cannot be resolved by reference to the purposes of the 
institution. The university's educational responsibility sheds no light 
on the question of who is to be educated-whether preference in 
admission should be given to applicants with the greatest intellectual 
potential, to those who are likely to hold power in later years, or to 
the members of disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups. A choice 
must be made among these and other possibilities, and if the choice is 
to be morally informed, those responsible for it must attend to the 
relevant moral issues. There is no apparent reason that others must 
refrain from attempting to influence that decision. 
More difficult questions are raised when an issue that must be 
addressed collectively involves moral concerns that arguably lie out-
side the province of the university. The disinvestment question offers 
a ready illustration. A collective decision about investment policy is 
inescapable, but the university's mission does not comprehend con-
cern for all the ramifications of its decisions. The university does not 
exist to promote social justice, but to educate its students and to foster 
the advancement of knowledge. In performing the latter functions, it 
may well contribute to the achievement of social justice, but it does so 
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indirectly, by enlarging the capacity of its students and by promoting 
the increase of knowledge. The consequence, it might be argued, is 
that universities may not appropriately risk the value of their 
endowments by refusing to invest in companies that do business in 
South Africa. 
The difficulty with this formulation of the argument against 
disinvestment is that it fails to recognize the need for ethical con-
straints on the manner in which the university pursues its central 
objectives. The need for such constraints is, however, frequently and 
properly recognized-for example, in rules designed to protect exper-
imental subjects even at the cost of inhibiting research that would 
contribute to the advancement of knowledge. Although the ethical 
prescription "do no harm" states too simplistic a standard, it is an 
appropriate reminder that we ought to concern ourselves with the 
harm that results from our actions. The prescription seems no less 
appropriate when power is exercised collectively than when it is 
exercised by individuals. Accordingly, if investment in companies 
doing business in South Africa contributes to the perpetuation of 
injustice, that consequence is a relevant consideration in deciding on a 
university investment policy. 
Nevertheless, I want to suggest that disinvestment-and hence,the 
pressure on universities to disinvest- may well be inappropriate 
because it employs the university's influence toward ends that are 
beyond the university's purview. The critical question is whether con-
tinued investment in companies doing business in South Africa 
actively contributes to perpetuation of the regime. If it does, as I have 
already argued, that consequence furnishes a legitimate, though 
not necessarily a decisive, reason for disinvestment. If it does not, 
however, disinvestment seems merely an effort to influence American 
public opinion toward South Africa, an aim that lies outside the 
purposes for which the university was established. However laudable 
the objective, the means chosen involves an appropriation of the 
university's influence. To repeat: individuals do not come together in 
the university for the purpose of jointly promoting the common good. 
Their association is for more limited purposes. To achieve those 
purposes, it will often be necessary to recognize that some part of the 
community must act in the name of the whole. But those who exer-
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cise that power-and by extension any attempt to influence them-
ought to be constrained by the purposes for which it is granted. 
They are not free to employ the resources they control as though 
those resources were their own. 
We have been considering situations in which an institutional deci-
sion is inescapable. In many situations, the university has another 
alternative: it may defer to the decisions of individuals. Many of the 
most important decisions in the university, especially those involving 
its educational and research activities, are made in that way. With 
some variation by discipline (and among universities), neither the 
educational program nor the research of the faculty is generally taken 
as a subject for collective decision. Although a few minimum require-
ments may be collectively established, the "curriculum" comprises 
mainly the aggregation of courses that individual faculty members 
wish to teach and the courses that individual students elect from the 
resulting smorgasbord. Collective decision about the aim and content 
of courses, including collectively prescribed courses, is even less likely. 
And even less institutional control is exercised over the faculty's 
research. The university thus becomes merely an environment with-
in which individuals may pursue their individual objectives. Its 
institutional responsibility is taken to be only that of fostering 
conditions that are maximally conducive to the achievement of 
those objectives. 
Any attempt to impose more particular responsibilities threatens 
that view of the university and the decision-making regime on which 
it rests. At my own university, for example, some faculty members 
and students maintain that no grant or contract for the development 
of weapons should be accepted. The argument rests on the claim that 
the university should be committed to humane values and that 
research that contributes to the destruction of human life is incompat-
ible with such a commitment. If these arguments are taken to define 
the moral responsibility of the university, that responsibility can 
be met only by limiting the freedom of individual investigators. 
Similarly, if universities are to be held responsible for the moral devel-
opment of their students, the institution- through some collective 
decision-making process-will have to assume greater control over 
the educational program . 
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Resistance to the idea that the university has such responsibilities 
is, not surprisingly, often grounded in a defense of the current diffu-
sion of authority. For present purposes, it will be sufficient to charac-
terize these arguments as involving a claim of academic freedom, a 
characterization that should bring home that the resistance also rests 
on a moral foundation. How the claim of academic freedom should 
be weighed against the claim of institutional responsibility is too large 
a question to be adequately addressed here, in part because it requires 
considerable attention to context. I want to make only one general 
observation: the reliance on academic freedom to avoid institutional 
responsibility too often ignores the extent to which the circumstances 
within which individual decisions are made have been created by 
the institution. It is only because the institution exists that a faculty 
member has students to teach. A faculty member's research is not 
only supported by institutional resources, but may also have been 
shaped by institutional expectations regarding research and the means 
by which it is to be financed. Institutional expectations regarding 
research may also influence decisions about the courses a faculty 
member wishes to teach. And students are not generally content to 
receive a piece of paper reciting that they have taken specified courses 
covering described materials. They want a degree that carries the seal 
of the university. 
These considerations do not carry us very far in balancing the com-
peting claims of academic freedom and institutional responsibility, 
but they do caution against pressing the former too hard. Some 
account must be taken of the fact that the decisions are made within 
an institution and that their consequences are in some measure 
affected by that circumstance. The institution cannot escape responsi-
bility for an individual's actions simply by asserting that they are not 
the product of a collective decision. Some responsibility follows from 
its having empowered him to act or from its influence on his decision 
to act in the way that he has. The ethical principle that requires 
disinvestment if continued investment would contribute to the per-
petuation of injustice seems equally to require collective safeguards 
against, for example, the abuse of students by faculty members. Hav-
ing set a force in motion, the university is ethically bound to safe-
guard against harms that may result from its having done so. 
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II 
This analysis suggests at least some limits on the role that the 
university should play in forming a social morality. The university 
does not have a roving commission to do good, nor does it have a 
mandate to serve as society's conscience. Whatever role it may have 
in forming a social morality is to be played out in the performance of 
its more limited responsibilities. Those responsibilities, it bears repeat-
ing, provide ample scope for significant contributions to the nation's 
moral life. The manner in which universities perform their responsi-
bilities is itself an important component of our collective moral life. It 
is also a significant influence on the moral understanding and behav-
ior of others. When, for example, universities illegally recruit star 
athletes, a lesson is taught to the young that is likely to have moral 
consequences far more important than the immediate consequences 
of the recruitment. 
Despite the range and importance of their other activities, it is in 
the performance of their most traditional function, the education of 
students, that universities are likely to have the most significant impact 
on social morality. Yet, even when attention is directed solely to that 
function, the role that universities should play in forming a social 
morality is not an issue that one can easily imagine arising until rela-
tively recently. As recently as fifty years ago-surely no more than 
seventy-five years ago-their place in the life of the nation was too 
peripheral for anyone to suppose that what they did would signifi-
cantly affect social morality. Colleges and universities were, of course, 
expected to attend to the moral development of their students, but 
throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth the 
percentage of the population attending institutions of higher educa-
tion, even among the more influential classes, was too small for 
the moral life of the nation to be greatly affected by the education 
students received. 
There are other and in many ways more interesting reasons that 
the question is a distinctively modern one. A century ago, it would 
have been assumed that a university's responsibility is to transmit 
morality. Now we are asked to consider the university's role in form-
ing a social morality. Those are very different conceptions of the 
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university's role, and it will be instructive to inquire why we should 
be led to consider a conception of the university's role so different 
from the one assumed by our grandparents and great-grandparents. 
An erosion of moral consensus during the past century might be 
thought to offer a partial explanation. Earlier generations were, on 
this view, bound together by a common moral understanding. Trans-
mitting that understanding, and inculcating a commitment to it, 
might seem an appropriate task of education because the society knew 
what it believed and, therefore, what it wanted its children to believe. 
With the erosion of consensus there is less certainty about what 
should be passed on to the next generation. We are, thus, asked to 
consider the university's role in forming a social morality because the 
felt need now is for a consensus to be forged from the current welter 
of moral understandings and commitments. 
The problem with this explanation lies in the difficulty of assessing 
the differences between our own and an earlier time. We are acutely 
aware of the moral disagreements in our own time, but just as moun-
tain peaks seem to flatten out as they recede, the controversies of an 
earlier time lose significance for us as our distance from them 
increases. Additional difficulties are posed by the necessity of gauging 
not merely the intensity of moral controversies in different periods, 
but the relative importance of the controversies in the overall social 
fabric. The question of whether there is less moral consensus now 
than fifty or a hundred years ago is, therefore, a complex historical 
problem that does not admit of answers as simple as those served up 
by nostalgia for a dimly perceived past. 
The period to which nostalgia tends to be directed is the latter half 
of the nineteenth and the early years of the current century. Whether 
moral consensus was or was not greater then than now, that time 
differed from our own in a number of ways relevant to the question 
of why universities in the earlier period might be taken to have 
responsibility for transmitting morality while it now seems appro-
priate to ask about their role in forming a social morality. Both the 
student bodies and the faculties of colleges and universities were a 
good deal more homogeneous then than now. The composition of 
both was restricted by race, ethnic group, class, religion, and sex. 
Homogeneity was enhanced by the local character of all institutions 
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and by the sectarian affiliation of many of them. Whatever differences 
there may have been in the larger society were, accordingly, consider-
ably softened by the similarity of background and resulting similarity 
of outlook among the members of a particular college or university 
community. The notion that universities are charged with transmit-
ting morality to the next generation fits much more easily into such 
an environment than it fits into the vastly different setting of contem-
porary higher education. 
Changing conceptions of morality have also played a part in alter-
ing ideas about the university's role. A century ago, morality was 
more likely than at present to be thought of as rooted in an external, 
generally a religious, source. Contemporary notions about morality 
are more likely to regard it as a human construct. The idea that edu-
cation consists, at least in part, of transmitting morality to students 
does not comport well with the latter conception of morality. If 
morality is a human construct, the prevailing understanding of it is 
always open to question, far more so than if it is thought to be rooted 
in an external source. Attention is thus directed away from the trans-
mission of morality toward questions about the wisdom of what has 
been constructed. The salience of those questions leads to uncertainty 
and controversy about what is to be transmitted. 
The idea that education ought to be concerned with transmitting 
moral values nonetheless persists and forms the basis for a good deal 
of current criticism of universities. The goals of an educational pro-
gram must, however, take some account of social circumstances, and 
it is a fair question whether the goals of the critics adequately take 
account of the circumstances of our society. 
The contemporary conception of morality as a human construct is 
reinforced by a contemporary tendency to regard prevailing social 
and economic structures as a subject of choice. Increasingly, those 
structures are not considered fixed, defining boundaries within which 
individual decisions must be made, but are themselves thought of as 
created by humans and, therefore, alterable by them. The ethic of 
individual responsibility that universities sought to transmit to stu-
dents in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries does not fit 
comfortably into this intellectual framework. The reason is not that 
issues of personal responsibility no longer seem important to us, but 
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that they have come to seem less important than issues of social and 
economic organization. The latter are no less moral issues than the 
former, but they are also political issues. At stake in the controversies 
over their resolution is the distribution of status, wealth, and power. 
Universities cannot undertake to transmit "answers" to most such 
issues if for no other reason than because our society has none to 
offer. In the absence of consensus and with the loss of faith in an 
external source of moral judgment, any effort by universities to incul-
cate their students with "answers" will seem merely a partisan 
response. 
The political character of the moral issues made salient by contem-
porary ways of thinking about morality is, however, only one of the 
difficulties that a contemporary university would face were it to view 
its task as that of transmitting morality to its students. Earlier, I con-
trasted an older conception of morality, one resting on external 
sources and emphasizing an ethic of individual responsibility, with a 
modern conception that regards morality as a human construct and 
that gives more emphasis to social and economic institutions than to 
individual responsibility. But the characterization of the former as 
"older" does not mean that it is no longer current. Contemporary 
Americans tend to hold both conceptions simultaneously, though the 
extent to which reliance is placed on one or the other differs widely in 
different parts of the population. 
The belief is widespread that universities have failed to attend 
adequately to the moral development of their students, but one con-
sequence of the moral divisions among us is disagreement about just 
where universities have failed. At the risk of caricature, the critics 
may be divided into two main camps: a "conservative" camp that 
deplores mainly the failure of universities to instill students with an 
ethic of individual responsibility, and a "liberal" camp that is prima-
rily critical of the universities' failure to inculcate a commitment 
to work toward social changes that will remedy various social and 
economic ills. The use of political labels to describe moral and educa-
tional positions seems appropriate in this instance because, perhaps 
not surprisingly, there is some correspondence between each camp's 
political agenda and what it perceives as the failing of higher 
education. 
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Drug use, violence, a lack of respect for authority, and declining 
standards of honesty and sexual morality rank high on the 
conservatives' list of pressing social problems. All are attributed in 
some measure to the failure of universities and other educational 
institutions to aid their students in developing an appropriate set of 
personal values. Not all of these problems are regarded as such by 
liberals, but even when they are, the remedies offered by liberals are 
likely to be quite different from those proposed by conservatives. The 
remedy proposed by the latter is implicit in their views about the 
source of the problems: universities should lead their students to an 
understanding of the importance of certain personal values, an under-
standing that would, if generally held, almost definitionally eliminate 
the problems. Liberals are more likely to attribute the problems to 
very different causes and, as a consequence, to offer very different 
remedies. Violence, they are likely to believe, is rooted in poverty and 
dishonesty among students attributable to the overwhelming pressure 
of current educational practices. The remedy, thus, is to eliminate 
poverty and reduce the pressure on students. The frequency of that 
response is itself likely to be taken by conservatives as a symptom of 
moral decay and probably also as a cause of it. 
In any event, the liberal critics of higher education regard racism, 
pollution, the persistence of poverty, and the threat of war as far 
more serious moral problems than those emphasized by conserva-
tives. Just as the conservative critics tend to look back with nostalgia 
to the nineteenth century, the liberal critics also have fond memories 
of a "golden age"- in their case the 1960s. The moral development 
at which education should aim, in their view, is an awakening 
of the remembered spirit of that time in each generation of students. 
Conservatives tend to reject that view on the ground that it politi-
cizes the educational process, an objection that liberals counter with 
the assertion that the quiescence produced by an ethic of individual 
responsibility is no less political. An education that emphasizes that 
ethic, the latter maintain, diverts attention from the most serious 
moral problems that our society confronts; worse, it leads students to 
hold individuals responsible for problems that are socially created and 
can be addressed only by an acceptance of social responsibility. 
Although they are admittedly caricatures, these broad-brush de-
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scriptions suggest the difficulties that the contemporary university 
would encounter were it to adopt either view. The moral develop-
ment at which each camp aims is a stance toward life. A university 
cannot inculcate the attitudes and values that either regards as 
appropriate merely by requiring students to register for a prescribed 
course, as it might if the task were only to assure that every graduate 
understands trigonometry or is acquainted with a set of ethical pre-
cepts. If the university is to be held responsible for the moral develop-
ment of students, as moral development is understood by both 
conservative and liberal critics, a pervasive commitment to that end 
will be required. Moral values permeate the curriculum- indeed, 
all of the relationships that the university has with its students. To 
discharge its responsibility, the university would be required to act 
collectively to assure that appropriate use is made of all the opportu-
nities thus presented. 
Collective decision would also be required about the moral views 
to be instilled in students. By whom is that decision to be made? 
In a relatively few institutions, generally those with close ties to a 
religious denomination, the question is not very difficult. Hierarchi-
cal relationships within the denomination or the shared moral per-
spectives of students and faculty furnish a sufficient answer. For most 
universities, the question will be more difficult, perhaps unanswer-
able. Their faculties, which traditionally have borne responsibility for 
the educational program, are as riven by moral differences as the 
general population. Those differences can be accommodated within 
the prevailing regime of laissez-faire, but that solution is ruled out by 
a conception of education that calls for inculcating prescribed values. 
Perhaps one need not be too concerned about the divisions within 
faculties, because it seems unlikely that their authority would con-
tinue for very long if they openly sought to inculcate collectively 
prescribed moral views. Public acceptance of faculty authority over 
the educational program rests in part on a belief in the faculty's exper-
tise. There is little reason to suppose that the public regards the fac-
ulty as having a special competence with respect to the great moral 
issues that confront the nation. Of course, sophisticated members 
of the public appreciate that moral ideas infuse much of what is 
taught in universities, but it is one thing to tolerate the freedom of the 
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faculty when students are exposed to a multitude of voices, no one of 
which is taken to be authoritative, and quite another to do so when 
the university speaks with a single voice. 
One may doubt also whether universities are capable of achieving 
the goals of those who look to them to provide moral guidance to 
students. At its best, higher education is a powerful experience-at 
times even a transforming one-greatly enhancing the capacities of 
students and opening them to wholly new possibilities in thinking 
about ways to live a life. It is, nonetheless, only one influence among 
many, and it is likely to be least influential in shaping the values of 
students. Sectarian institutions that draw their student bodies prima-
rily from a narrow population that share a common outlook must, 
once again, be sharply distinguished from other colleges and 
universities. The former, like nineteenth-century institutions, are 
called upon to reinforce values that hold sway in the community 
from which their students come and to which they will return. The 
student bodies of most institutions, by contrast, are drawn from 
diverse backgrounds, and they anticipate lives in a world character-
ized by a diversity of values and ethical practices. The connotations 
of the phrase "ivory tower" suggest the limited influence of the 
university when it seeks to impart values that diverge very markedly 
from those that students perceive in the outside world. 
In recent years, for example, the organized bar has expressed con-
siderable concern about the ethical behavior of lawyers and their 
commitment to professional ideals. The concerns expressed range over 
a broad area, from the frequency of dishonesty and lawbreaking by 
lawyers to an asserted failure of many lawyers to meet their public 
responsibilities. Among the issues raised are some that are highly 
controversial, such as the appropriate balance between zealous pursuit 
of a client's goals and recognition of public and other interests that 
may conflict with those goals. The most tangible consequences of 
the bar's avowed concern are a requirement that law schools require 
their students to take a course in professional responsibility and an 
admonition to faculties to emphasize ethical issues throughout the 
curriculum. It is, however, naive to suppose that a course-or even 
three years of legal education-will have a decisive influence on the 
behavior of most law school graduates. Even if law faculties were of 
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one mind regarding the issues-a wildly improbable supposition-too 
many other factors are at work that overpower whatever influence 
three years of legal education may have. 
Students come to law schools as adults. They are a good deal less 
malleable than seems to be supposed by those who look to legal edu-
cation to solve the ethical problems of the profession. To be sure, the 
determinants of lawyer behavior are not irrevocably fixed prior to 
the first day of law school, but to the extent that the personal 
characteristics, attitudes, and values of fledgling lawyers are still being 
shaped, lessons learned in law school about the appropriate behavior 
of lawyers are, for nearly all students, likely to be much less influen-
tial than what they learn from observing the behavior of practicing 
lawyers. It should not be surprising that the lawyers encountered in 
summer clerkships and in the early years of practice are the models to 
whom students and young lawyers look for clues about how they 
ought to conduct themselves. After all, it is those lawyers, not the 
members of law faculties, who face the questions that students and 
young lawyers confront in practice and who lead the lives to which 
the latter aspire. 
III 
The hopes of both conservative and liberal critics misconceive the 
aims of higher education and its potential. A pluralist society cannot 
accommodate a conception of education that calls for inculcating 
controversial moral values. 3 It does not follow that universities have 
no role in the moral development of their students. In the remainder 
of this essay, I want to sketch briefly some ideas about the contribu-
tion universities can make. 
At one time, there would have been widespread agreement that, as 
Herbert Spencer put it, "education has for its object the formation of 
character."4 In the sense that Spencer employed it, the word 
"character" is not heard very often these days. So used, it is less likely 
to inspire than to evoke a faint smile. The loss of meaning is regretta-
ble, for the word captured an aggregation of qualities that are highly 
useful in sustaining a life. A man or woman of character has a moral 
code, but he or she also has something more: the personal strengths 
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that are necessary to steadfastness of purpose in the face of life's 
vicissitudes. Disappointment, embarrassment, boredom, fear, pain, 
and temptation are obstacles to the attainment of our goals. They are 
also part of the common experience of mankind. Courage, patience, 
perseverance, and other qualities that enable us to overcome these 
impediments are, for that reason, universally regarded as virtues, 
and since they are necessary to the success of any sustained moral 
undertaking, their enhancement is a central element of moral 
development. 
Developing these virtues is a traditional aim of education, one that 
deserves greater emphasis than it currently receives in higher educa-
tion. Colleges and universities are not, to be sure, positioned to play a 
decisive role in the formation of their students' characters. Students 
come to them as adults or near-adults. The faculty-student ratio 
and other demands on the faculty's time tend to preclude a level of 
personal contact that might permit faculty members to become an 
important personal influence in the lives of their students. Still, the 
limited potential of higher education for influencing the development 
of character does not justify a conclusion that it is irrelevant to that 
development. Character traits like those we are considering are, as 
Joseph Schwab has written, "enhanced only by undertaking and 
sustaining the actions pertaining to [them] to the point of perceiving 
and enjoying the enhanced competence which results."> By availing 
themselves of the opportunities they have for leading students to such 
actions, universities can strengthen those traits. The opposite is also 
true. Inappropriate behavior can help to weaken them. 
Several years ago, in a talk concerned with issues in legal educa-
tion, I urged that faculty inattention to class attendance, preparedness 
for class, timely submission of papers, and the like represented missed 
opportunities for assisting students to develop desirable character traits 
and, worse, probably contributed to their erosion.6 The following 
day, a privately published newsletter carried a prominent faculty 
member's critical account of the talk under the headline "Sandalow 
Calls For Repression." The lesson, I suppose, is that we live in a time 
in which every objective may be regarded as political. Nevertheless, 
the virtues I have been considering are not very controversial, and the 
effort to develop them does not threaten pluralist values. They are not 
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only compatible with but necessary to widely differing visions of 
moral responsibility. 
In any event, the university's greatest potential for influencing the 
moral development of students is in the contribution that it can make 
to their intellectual development. Moral judgments are not purely 
matters of taste, about which individuals differ as they do when one 
prefers tomatoes and another prefers carrots. They depend on knowl-
edge and disciplined thought. Although formal education is but one 
influence among many affecting character development, it is in our 
society the chief instrument of intellectual development. 
Universities thus play an important role in the moral development 
of students when they assist the latter in developing the capacity to 
think clearly, to identify and articulate premises, and to develop argu-
ments that flow in an orderly fashion from those premises. Enhancing 
the ability of students to read, similarly, contributes significandy to 
their capacity for informed moral judgment. The ability to capture 
meaning from the printed word and to understand the possibilities 
and uses of fixity, vagueness, ambiguity, and change in language is 
essential to participation in a community of thought that extends 
beyond very narrow boundaries of space and time, boundaries that 
would otherwise confine moral judgment within personal experience. 
Moral judgment is also aided by a number of intellectual virtues 
whose development is a central task of higher education. These vir-
tues are best described negatively, as freedom from common hazards 
to clear thought-hazards such as self-interest, provincialism of time 
and place, overdependence on familiar categories of thought, senti-
mentality, and an inability to tolerate uncertainty. 
Informed moral judgment also depends on knowledge. At the most 
elementary level, students need to develop an understanding of the 
crucial role of facts in moral judgments. Facts are, however, all around 
us, and their significance is not generally self-evident. Some compre-
hension is also required of the theories that men have developed in an 
effort to apprehend the world around them. An informed moral judg-
ment may, thus, depend on familiarity with economics, biology, or 
any of the other social or natural sciences. In acquainting its students 
with those subjects the university makes an important contribution to 
their moral development. The capacity for informed moral judgment 
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is, finally, enhanced by familiarity with the ideas that others have had 
about moral issues. The study of ethics, literature, law, and other 
humanistic disciplines, is, therefore, also important to the moral devel-
opment of students, not as instruction in morality, but in enlarging 
the range of ideas available to students in thinking about moral issues. 
The university thus contributes to the moral development of 
students even when it seems inattentive to that objective. In attending 
to their intellectual development, it contributes also to their moral 
development by enhancing their capacity to make moral judgments. 
That is not an inconsiderable contribution. My experience may be 
atypical, but the young people I have known during a quarter-
century as a member of a university faculty have not, in the main, 
been morally indifferent. It is tempting to say, rather, that too many 
have suffered from a surfeit of morality. The real problem, however, 
is not an excess of moral commitment, but the superficiality of their 
moral judgments, their intensity of feeling about issues they have 
barely considered. They are deeply sensitive to moral issues, but their 
education too often seems to have left them ill equipped to judge 
those issues, at times even unaware of what is involved in making 
a moral judgment. A strengthening of the university's educational 
program to overcome these deficiencies would make a far more impor-
tant contribution to the moral development of these young people 
and to our collective moral life than any effort to inculcate students 
with a particular conception of morality . 
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